Political Science 325: Arab-Israeli Relations
Examining America's Role in the Peace Process: Israel/Palestine
The Palestinian national movement came to existence in the face of extreme oppression. If the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis was egalitarian, then the question of whether or not this movement can be defined as terrorism would be relevant to knowing how to solve the issues at hand. However, because there is an overarching power structure that shapes the international and national perception of Palestinians, the issue becomes one that must addressed first on a structural level. There are many examples of how the Israeli society is privileged over the Palestinian society, stemming from the international lobby the Zionists have always upheld with powerful countries, which has ensured their ongoing existence and stubborn success in war and peace processes. In this paper, I will analyze the means by which the Israeli state maintains power over the Palestinians and ensures their ongoing suppression within their own historic homeland. If peace in the region is the goal, the privileges of Israeli society must first be acknowledged before sustainable solutions can be found.
Coming from an oriental perspective on the definition of "state," and because international opinion created Israel and therefore has an inherent role in the peace of the region, it is easy to see that the solution must be defined in terms of "one- or two-states." However, in reality, the key to legitimate peace is rights and guaranteeing the basic needs of all residents (official or refuge) of the region. As long as the Israelis are privileged by America and other international players, they will continue to illegally take Palestinian land because there has been no international consequence thus far. In the first section, I will analyze the structural problems with labeling the Palestinian national movement a “terrorist” movement rather than a legitimate group with power in the P.A. In the second section, I will analyze the way closure has an effect on the power dynamic and how it can be addressed for solutions to the conflict.
Definition of terrorist
First, it is necessary to define the term "terror" and a "terrorist." There is not an agreed upon term, but often the definition includes non-state actors engaged in political violence and is distinguishable from acts of war or insurgency. Based on this definition, it is easy to label the Palestinian national movement as a terrorist organisation, as they are attempting to force political change through terror. But for the purpose of this paper, I will move away from defining terror and instead analyze why this label only plays into an oppressive structure that perpetuates the discrimination of Palestinian people. In this paper I will discuss the options for peace, and how focusing on the terrorism of the oppressed group will never result in peace.
The label of terrorist, at this point, serves no purpose besides allowing the colonialist fear of Muslims-which is then schemized with Palestinians-to be justified. In using the label of terrorist, the frame is too narrow, and only focuses on the acts of Hamas, rather than the power structures in place that gave rise to that terrorism. In an article written by Mahjoob Zwieri, the legitimate claim Hamas has to power is contextualized within the history of the Palestinian Authority. Zwieri shows how Hamas was highly desirable to Palestinians at a time of corruption and worsening relations with Israel which undermines the definition of their group as a terrorist group because it was-and continues to be-a state actor. Hamas is not a terrorist group because their rise to power was legitimate and orchestrated as the result of the ongoing tension between Palestine and Israel. So if Hamas is a representative group rather than an extremist minority, it is necessary to then analyze the political atmosphere that gave rise to this group.
Rather than being seen as a terrorist group, Palestinian national movements can be seen as a positive outlet for a suppressed population to reclaim their culture. In describing Hamas’ rise to power, Sara Roy explains the conditions under which they gained popularity and mentions the importance of cultural threats to Palestinian society that made more extremist groups necessary. Roy says that the idea was to create a society “that was more Islamic, as a form of protection against all forms of aggression.” Roy thus shows how the national movement was not an aggressive movement to push out Judaism or Israeli society, but rather an insulating movement to nurture the Islamic society that was severely impacted after the Oslo Accords. The Palestinian national movement, under this context, is understandable and important to the existence of Palestine under the threat of extinction. To label such movements as terrorist groups and to advocate for their removal from society is to threaten the existence of Palestine. Rather than encouraging peace, the terrorist label only fans the flames of resistance, which would not be necessary if their existence was not in danger.
Peace attempts
In this section I will analyze the failure of past peace attempts. Because peace has historically focused upon external factors not relevant to the power structures, they have only entrenched an already divided society. Up until this point, peace processes have largely focused on political peace, which inherently disregards the structural problems ensuring the Palestinian people will never have the same rights as Israelis. One example of attempting peace through political means is in defining Jerusalem as a city. This is the contested capital of both Palestine and Israel, and US foreign politics has recently taken to this issue as the defining problem in the region. However, if one looks at previous peace attempts, making any sort of political statement about Jerusalem will not lead to peace because the problem is not about where the capital of Israel is, it’s about the rights granted to Palestinians. In a paper by Martin Indyk, he demonstrates through his analysis that even a compromise on the issue of Jerusalem would favor Israel because of the current power dynamic that exists in the region. He states that in the case of a compromise between the two, “Israel would be required to accept a Palestinian capital in Arab east Jerusalem in return for Arab, Muslim, and international recognition of Israel’s capital in an undivided Jerusalem.” This is the political compromise, but the reality is that it still favors Israel. From history, we know that even when mandated to do so, Israel refuses to acknowledge the existence of Palestinians unless defined as a threat, so one is left to wonder how requiring Israel to accept a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem will change anything about the current atmosphere.
One of the more contemporary examples of ways the peace processes have not acknowledged the power structures fueling the conflict is the Oslo Accords of 1993. In an essay detailing the conditions of the “Land for Peace,” Joseph Massad discusses how this very framework around which the Oslo Accords were structured is colonialist and a form of oppression. Massad explains that “[land for peace presupposes] that Israel has ‘land’ which it would be willing to give to the ‘Arabs’, and that the ‘Arabs’--seen as responsible for the state of war with Israel--can grant Israel the peace for which is has longed for decades.” Under this assumption, the language of the accords allowed Israel to make interpretations that favored their zionist aims under the assumption that they were under attack. This assumption legitimized much of the privileges Israelis see today, since the apartheid wall was built, “effectively removing another 10 percent of the West Bank from the negotiating table and its army redeployment.” In this way, Palestinian existence is continually erased to allow for Israeli conquest that is supported by international actors.
Rather, I will argue that peace must come from the bottom up if lasting political change will ever foreseeably occur in the land. Although his language leans towards an Israeli bias, this option is outlined by Indyk when he says the US administration must “promote a united Palestinian leadership with a mandate to negotiate peace with Israel” by stopping the illegal movement of Israeli settlers into Palestinian land. In saying “negotiate peace with Israel,” Indyk is slightly playing into the idea that it must be Palestine to initiate peace, perhaps influenced by the stereotype of the “angry Arab.” Regardless of this, the overall point of this approach to peace remains relevant, in that Indyk suggests change from within the countries is necessary before the governments can be successfully reformed. This approach to peace is the only way tensions in the local and broader region will quelled because it is the only approach not yet attempted by the international community.
I will now outline two important changes that can only be made internally. The first is changes within the government, both Israeli and Palestinian. The change that must happen within the Israeli government can be seen as much more difficult because it requires a systematic change in the way Palestinians are treated and viewed by the government. The PA must change, but as the representatives of a discriminated group, these changes will have less significance than the changes of the Israeli government. Before outlining these changes, it is important to define Israel as the privileged group and Palestine as the oppressed group. In a chapter of Menachem Klein’s book Dividing Divided Jerusalem, he shows the purpose of open borders as being a way for Palestinians to regain a sense of identity in the face of Israeli’s oppressive psychological marginalization. He states that “an Israeli sense of superiority has crystallized since 1967” and combined with international support, this has created a racist mindset within the Israeli government that legitimizes the discrimination of Palestinians through closed borders.
Government changes
In this section I will outline the importance of the freedom of movement for Palestinians including the diaspora. The closed borders is a way of entrenching an oppressive economic structure that has psychological consequences as the Palestinian people must watch their culture disappear. Although from a western perspective, it might be easy to assume that the border between Palestine and Israel is clear and defined and there is a universal understanding of what each government presides over as well as their duties in said territory. However, the reality is that the bureaucracy is convoluted and varied, especially since the illegal occupation of Palestinian homes and streets. This conflict between bureaucracy makes an unlivable situation in many cities and supports the cleavage between two groups-be it Palestinians and Israelis, Muslims and Jews, or Arabs and non-Arabs. The divisions in the society are upheld by the government through checkpoints and borders, so the psychological chasms must be overcome by first eradicating the physical chasms.
There are a number of ways this closing of borders hurts the Palestinian people, both economically and psychologically. Economically, Palestine has experienced what Sara Roy describes as “de-development” which is distinct from underdevelopment by being perpetually undermined by the stronger economy. So while an underdeveloped economy is working towards fixing itself, an economy that is de-developing is gradually in a process of being torn down and undermined by another economy. In this case, it is the Israeli economy that is undermining the Palestinian economy through the use of borders and checkpoints, making it disproportionately more difficult for the transfer of Palestinian goods. This shuts down the Palestinian economy and their economic relations with businesses outside of the immediate land, and reduces their reliability as employees even within the land. Because of the imposed restrictions on movement, Palestinians have seen not only the closing of economic opportunities, but also the means by which to claim their culture and demand acknowledgment. While Israel is benefitted by international lobbies, Palestine is further erased by the complexities of bureaucracy and the simple fact that they cannot leave their physical space.
One of the ways Israel has ensured this dominant position is through extensive international lobbying. This began with thee zionist lobby in Britain after the first world war and continues with the American lobby today, and is a source of legitimizing the existence of Jewish people in the land, a privilege not shared by the Palestinians. The lead up to the British Mandate was prefaced by a well-established existence of a Zionist lobby in Britain. In Fayez Sayegh’s essay on the roots of Zionism and its rise in Palestine, he outlines the marriage of Zionism to British colonialism after the first world war when British interests were perceived to be furthered through an alliance with the Zionists. Zionists were funded by the British, who lost no time in “creating the appropriate conditions for Zionist colonisation.” Therefore, because the Zionist state came into existence through the help of colonial powers, they will continue to be privileged in a way that Palestinians are not. This is important in understanding ways in which the Palestinians are kept from changing their fate, as they have been denied credibility from the start, and with the closure of borders, they have been denied the opportunity to create international ties.
The Israeli lobby continues to exist today in America. Combined with the economic closing of borders, this continues to erase the existence of Palestinians. The effect this lobby has on Israel as well as America is explained as complex. Although the strategic value of this lobby is questionable, America continues to support Israel through mass amounts of diplomatic and economic support. In the paper “The Israeli Lobby,” this support is questioned and from an international diplomacy standpoint, proven to be uneven to the strategic benefits of such an alliance. Which means that the Israeli Lobby in America is almost entirely founded upon institutional narratives that are allowed to be echoed throughout many aspects of American society. This adds an extra layer of complexity because it supports the colonialist idea that Americans have a place in the international diplomacy of states far away. Perhaps more compelling, however, is the fact that this lobby is a privilege of the Israelis that the Palestinians do not have. As an institution, the American Israeli lobby will not likely go away soon, but any chance the Palestinians had of institutionalizing their own American lobby was initially crushed by the marriage of Zionism to foreign actors. Then this hope was further undermined by the closing of borders and the bureaucracy that makes it difficult for Palestinians to have a voice.
When facing extinction, a group of people will turn to violent means. Faced with a history of silence, the Palestinians did not have many open options for voicing their existence besides radical violence. I want to state here that I am not arguing that all Palestinians turn to violent measures, but rather that it is understandable how Hamas came to power. The history of this conflict has favored the Israelis, time and time again, so faced with both physical and psychological isolation, some Palestinians turned to one means of a voice recognized by the international community. Although supporting a violent group may seem counterproductive in the pursuit of peace, I suggest that the violence parts of Palestinian society do not exist for the purpose of violence, but rather for a way to state their existence. So if given the opportunity to express this in a nonviolent way, it would be taken and rather than exacerbate the violence, would eventually lead to peace negotiations that would be less stagnant and equally negotiate the issues of the conflict.
There are many confounding issues in the conflict of the land occupied by Israel. This paper mainly focuses on the way the Israeli government has been privileged in peace processes which translates into their unchecked oppressive tactics towards the Palestinians. That is not to say that there are not issues within the Palestinian government. As a government, the PA has historically been complacent towards the Palestinian people. But in this paper, I want to show that the primary problem is one of oppression and privilege and that to make any advances towards peace or even tolerance, both parties must feel that their existence is vital to the land. When power dynamics are involved, it becomes incredibly difficult to make lasting peace because the privileged do not want to give up their privileges and the oppressed are silenced. The historic peace processes have largely ignored the existence of Palestinian people in the land, which means the peace processes have not been egalitarian. After the Palestinians are granted rights, a democratic peace process can move forward for the benefit of all that live there.
Bibliography
Indyk, Martin. "President Trump’s Options for Israeli-Palestinian Deal Making." In Brookings Big Ideas for America, edited by O’Hanlon, Michael E., 313-22. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017. http://www.jstor.org.knox.idm.oclc.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1kk66tr.36.
Klein, Menachem, and Haim Watzman. "Dividing Divided Jerusalem." In A Possible Peace Between Israel and Palestine: An Insider's Account of the Geneva Initiative, 81-144. Columbia University Press, 2007. http://www.jstor.org.knox.idm.oclc.org/stable/10.7312/klei13904.6.
Massad, Joseph. “Oslo and the end of Palestinian Independence.” Presentation at a conference in Oslo, 2009.
Roy, Sara. “De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society since Oslo.” Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 64-82.
Roy, Sara. "Hamas and the Transformation(s) of Political Islam in Palestine." In Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 294-308. London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007. doi:10.2307/j.ctt18dzscm.22.
Sayegh, Fayez. “Zionist Colonialism in Palestine (1965)” In Settler Colonial Studies 2, no. 1 (2012): 206-225.
"The Israeli Lobby." Journal of Palestine Studies 35, no. 3 (2006): 83-114. doi:10.1525/jps.2006.35.3.83.
Zweiri, Mahjoob. "The Hamas Victory: Shifting Sands or Major Earthquake?" Third World Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2006): 675-87. http://www.jstor.org.knox.idm.oclc.org/stable/4017731.
The Palestinian national movement came to existence in the face of extreme oppression. If the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis was egalitarian, then the question of whether or not this movement can be defined as terrorism would be relevant to knowing how to solve the issues at hand. However, because there is an overarching power structure that shapes the international and national perception of Palestinians, the issue becomes one that must addressed first on a structural level. There are many examples of how the Israeli society is privileged over the Palestinian society, stemming from the international lobby the Zionists have always upheld with powerful countries, which has ensured their ongoing existence and stubborn success in war and peace processes. In this paper, I will analyze the means by which the Israeli state maintains power over the Palestinians and ensures their ongoing suppression within their own historic homeland. If peace in the region is the goal, the privileges of Israeli society must first be acknowledged before sustainable solutions can be found.
Coming from an oriental perspective on the definition of "state," and because international opinion created Israel and therefore has an inherent role in the peace of the region, it is easy to see that the solution must be defined in terms of "one- or two-states." However, in reality, the key to legitimate peace is rights and guaranteeing the basic needs of all residents (official or refuge) of the region. As long as the Israelis are privileged by America and other international players, they will continue to illegally take Palestinian land because there has been no international consequence thus far. In the first section, I will analyze the structural problems with labeling the Palestinian national movement a “terrorist” movement rather than a legitimate group with power in the P.A. In the second section, I will analyze the way closure has an effect on the power dynamic and how it can be addressed for solutions to the conflict.
Definition of terrorist
First, it is necessary to define the term "terror" and a "terrorist." There is not an agreed upon term, but often the definition includes non-state actors engaged in political violence and is distinguishable from acts of war or insurgency. Based on this definition, it is easy to label the Palestinian national movement as a terrorist organisation, as they are attempting to force political change through terror. But for the purpose of this paper, I will move away from defining terror and instead analyze why this label only plays into an oppressive structure that perpetuates the discrimination of Palestinian people. In this paper I will discuss the options for peace, and how focusing on the terrorism of the oppressed group will never result in peace.
The label of terrorist, at this point, serves no purpose besides allowing the colonialist fear of Muslims-which is then schemized with Palestinians-to be justified. In using the label of terrorist, the frame is too narrow, and only focuses on the acts of Hamas, rather than the power structures in place that gave rise to that terrorism. In an article written by Mahjoob Zwieri, the legitimate claim Hamas has to power is contextualized within the history of the Palestinian Authority. Zwieri shows how Hamas was highly desirable to Palestinians at a time of corruption and worsening relations with Israel which undermines the definition of their group as a terrorist group because it was-and continues to be-a state actor. Hamas is not a terrorist group because their rise to power was legitimate and orchestrated as the result of the ongoing tension between Palestine and Israel. So if Hamas is a representative group rather than an extremist minority, it is necessary to then analyze the political atmosphere that gave rise to this group.
Rather than being seen as a terrorist group, Palestinian national movements can be seen as a positive outlet for a suppressed population to reclaim their culture. In describing Hamas’ rise to power, Sara Roy explains the conditions under which they gained popularity and mentions the importance of cultural threats to Palestinian society that made more extremist groups necessary. Roy says that the idea was to create a society “that was more Islamic, as a form of protection against all forms of aggression.” Roy thus shows how the national movement was not an aggressive movement to push out Judaism or Israeli society, but rather an insulating movement to nurture the Islamic society that was severely impacted after the Oslo Accords. The Palestinian national movement, under this context, is understandable and important to the existence of Palestine under the threat of extinction. To label such movements as terrorist groups and to advocate for their removal from society is to threaten the existence of Palestine. Rather than encouraging peace, the terrorist label only fans the flames of resistance, which would not be necessary if their existence was not in danger.
Peace attempts
In this section I will analyze the failure of past peace attempts. Because peace has historically focused upon external factors not relevant to the power structures, they have only entrenched an already divided society. Up until this point, peace processes have largely focused on political peace, which inherently disregards the structural problems ensuring the Palestinian people will never have the same rights as Israelis. One example of attempting peace through political means is in defining Jerusalem as a city. This is the contested capital of both Palestine and Israel, and US foreign politics has recently taken to this issue as the defining problem in the region. However, if one looks at previous peace attempts, making any sort of political statement about Jerusalem will not lead to peace because the problem is not about where the capital of Israel is, it’s about the rights granted to Palestinians. In a paper by Martin Indyk, he demonstrates through his analysis that even a compromise on the issue of Jerusalem would favor Israel because of the current power dynamic that exists in the region. He states that in the case of a compromise between the two, “Israel would be required to accept a Palestinian capital in Arab east Jerusalem in return for Arab, Muslim, and international recognition of Israel’s capital in an undivided Jerusalem.” This is the political compromise, but the reality is that it still favors Israel. From history, we know that even when mandated to do so, Israel refuses to acknowledge the existence of Palestinians unless defined as a threat, so one is left to wonder how requiring Israel to accept a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem will change anything about the current atmosphere.
One of the more contemporary examples of ways the peace processes have not acknowledged the power structures fueling the conflict is the Oslo Accords of 1993. In an essay detailing the conditions of the “Land for Peace,” Joseph Massad discusses how this very framework around which the Oslo Accords were structured is colonialist and a form of oppression. Massad explains that “[land for peace presupposes] that Israel has ‘land’ which it would be willing to give to the ‘Arabs’, and that the ‘Arabs’--seen as responsible for the state of war with Israel--can grant Israel the peace for which is has longed for decades.” Under this assumption, the language of the accords allowed Israel to make interpretations that favored their zionist aims under the assumption that they were under attack. This assumption legitimized much of the privileges Israelis see today, since the apartheid wall was built, “effectively removing another 10 percent of the West Bank from the negotiating table and its army redeployment.” In this way, Palestinian existence is continually erased to allow for Israeli conquest that is supported by international actors.
Rather, I will argue that peace must come from the bottom up if lasting political change will ever foreseeably occur in the land. Although his language leans towards an Israeli bias, this option is outlined by Indyk when he says the US administration must “promote a united Palestinian leadership with a mandate to negotiate peace with Israel” by stopping the illegal movement of Israeli settlers into Palestinian land. In saying “negotiate peace with Israel,” Indyk is slightly playing into the idea that it must be Palestine to initiate peace, perhaps influenced by the stereotype of the “angry Arab.” Regardless of this, the overall point of this approach to peace remains relevant, in that Indyk suggests change from within the countries is necessary before the governments can be successfully reformed. This approach to peace is the only way tensions in the local and broader region will quelled because it is the only approach not yet attempted by the international community.
I will now outline two important changes that can only be made internally. The first is changes within the government, both Israeli and Palestinian. The change that must happen within the Israeli government can be seen as much more difficult because it requires a systematic change in the way Palestinians are treated and viewed by the government. The PA must change, but as the representatives of a discriminated group, these changes will have less significance than the changes of the Israeli government. Before outlining these changes, it is important to define Israel as the privileged group and Palestine as the oppressed group. In a chapter of Menachem Klein’s book Dividing Divided Jerusalem, he shows the purpose of open borders as being a way for Palestinians to regain a sense of identity in the face of Israeli’s oppressive psychological marginalization. He states that “an Israeli sense of superiority has crystallized since 1967” and combined with international support, this has created a racist mindset within the Israeli government that legitimizes the discrimination of Palestinians through closed borders.
Government changes
In this section I will outline the importance of the freedom of movement for Palestinians including the diaspora. The closed borders is a way of entrenching an oppressive economic structure that has psychological consequences as the Palestinian people must watch their culture disappear. Although from a western perspective, it might be easy to assume that the border between Palestine and Israel is clear and defined and there is a universal understanding of what each government presides over as well as their duties in said territory. However, the reality is that the bureaucracy is convoluted and varied, especially since the illegal occupation of Palestinian homes and streets. This conflict between bureaucracy makes an unlivable situation in many cities and supports the cleavage between two groups-be it Palestinians and Israelis, Muslims and Jews, or Arabs and non-Arabs. The divisions in the society are upheld by the government through checkpoints and borders, so the psychological chasms must be overcome by first eradicating the physical chasms.
There are a number of ways this closing of borders hurts the Palestinian people, both economically and psychologically. Economically, Palestine has experienced what Sara Roy describes as “de-development” which is distinct from underdevelopment by being perpetually undermined by the stronger economy. So while an underdeveloped economy is working towards fixing itself, an economy that is de-developing is gradually in a process of being torn down and undermined by another economy. In this case, it is the Israeli economy that is undermining the Palestinian economy through the use of borders and checkpoints, making it disproportionately more difficult for the transfer of Palestinian goods. This shuts down the Palestinian economy and their economic relations with businesses outside of the immediate land, and reduces their reliability as employees even within the land. Because of the imposed restrictions on movement, Palestinians have seen not only the closing of economic opportunities, but also the means by which to claim their culture and demand acknowledgment. While Israel is benefitted by international lobbies, Palestine is further erased by the complexities of bureaucracy and the simple fact that they cannot leave their physical space.
One of the ways Israel has ensured this dominant position is through extensive international lobbying. This began with thee zionist lobby in Britain after the first world war and continues with the American lobby today, and is a source of legitimizing the existence of Jewish people in the land, a privilege not shared by the Palestinians. The lead up to the British Mandate was prefaced by a well-established existence of a Zionist lobby in Britain. In Fayez Sayegh’s essay on the roots of Zionism and its rise in Palestine, he outlines the marriage of Zionism to British colonialism after the first world war when British interests were perceived to be furthered through an alliance with the Zionists. Zionists were funded by the British, who lost no time in “creating the appropriate conditions for Zionist colonisation.” Therefore, because the Zionist state came into existence through the help of colonial powers, they will continue to be privileged in a way that Palestinians are not. This is important in understanding ways in which the Palestinians are kept from changing their fate, as they have been denied credibility from the start, and with the closure of borders, they have been denied the opportunity to create international ties.
The Israeli lobby continues to exist today in America. Combined with the economic closing of borders, this continues to erase the existence of Palestinians. The effect this lobby has on Israel as well as America is explained as complex. Although the strategic value of this lobby is questionable, America continues to support Israel through mass amounts of diplomatic and economic support. In the paper “The Israeli Lobby,” this support is questioned and from an international diplomacy standpoint, proven to be uneven to the strategic benefits of such an alliance. Which means that the Israeli Lobby in America is almost entirely founded upon institutional narratives that are allowed to be echoed throughout many aspects of American society. This adds an extra layer of complexity because it supports the colonialist idea that Americans have a place in the international diplomacy of states far away. Perhaps more compelling, however, is the fact that this lobby is a privilege of the Israelis that the Palestinians do not have. As an institution, the American Israeli lobby will not likely go away soon, but any chance the Palestinians had of institutionalizing their own American lobby was initially crushed by the marriage of Zionism to foreign actors. Then this hope was further undermined by the closing of borders and the bureaucracy that makes it difficult for Palestinians to have a voice.
When facing extinction, a group of people will turn to violent means. Faced with a history of silence, the Palestinians did not have many open options for voicing their existence besides radical violence. I want to state here that I am not arguing that all Palestinians turn to violent measures, but rather that it is understandable how Hamas came to power. The history of this conflict has favored the Israelis, time and time again, so faced with both physical and psychological isolation, some Palestinians turned to one means of a voice recognized by the international community. Although supporting a violent group may seem counterproductive in the pursuit of peace, I suggest that the violence parts of Palestinian society do not exist for the purpose of violence, but rather for a way to state their existence. So if given the opportunity to express this in a nonviolent way, it would be taken and rather than exacerbate the violence, would eventually lead to peace negotiations that would be less stagnant and equally negotiate the issues of the conflict.
There are many confounding issues in the conflict of the land occupied by Israel. This paper mainly focuses on the way the Israeli government has been privileged in peace processes which translates into their unchecked oppressive tactics towards the Palestinians. That is not to say that there are not issues within the Palestinian government. As a government, the PA has historically been complacent towards the Palestinian people. But in this paper, I want to show that the primary problem is one of oppression and privilege and that to make any advances towards peace or even tolerance, both parties must feel that their existence is vital to the land. When power dynamics are involved, it becomes incredibly difficult to make lasting peace because the privileged do not want to give up their privileges and the oppressed are silenced. The historic peace processes have largely ignored the existence of Palestinian people in the land, which means the peace processes have not been egalitarian. After the Palestinians are granted rights, a democratic peace process can move forward for the benefit of all that live there.
Bibliography
Indyk, Martin. "President Trump’s Options for Israeli-Palestinian Deal Making." In Brookings Big Ideas for America, edited by O’Hanlon, Michael E., 313-22. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017. http://www.jstor.org.knox.idm.oclc.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1kk66tr.36.
Klein, Menachem, and Haim Watzman. "Dividing Divided Jerusalem." In A Possible Peace Between Israel and Palestine: An Insider's Account of the Geneva Initiative, 81-144. Columbia University Press, 2007. http://www.jstor.org.knox.idm.oclc.org/stable/10.7312/klei13904.6.
Massad, Joseph. “Oslo and the end of Palestinian Independence.” Presentation at a conference in Oslo, 2009.
Roy, Sara. “De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society since Oslo.” Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 64-82.
Roy, Sara. "Hamas and the Transformation(s) of Political Islam in Palestine." In Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 294-308. London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007. doi:10.2307/j.ctt18dzscm.22.
Sayegh, Fayez. “Zionist Colonialism in Palestine (1965)” In Settler Colonial Studies 2, no. 1 (2012): 206-225.
"The Israeli Lobby." Journal of Palestine Studies 35, no. 3 (2006): 83-114. doi:10.1525/jps.2006.35.3.83.
Zweiri, Mahjoob. "The Hamas Victory: Shifting Sands or Major Earthquake?" Third World Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2006): 675-87. http://www.jstor.org.knox.idm.oclc.org/stable/4017731.
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